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THE INSURANCE DEFINITION OF "AUTOMOBILE"
Curtis M. Elliott*
I. INTRODUCTION
The word "automobile" has a relatively precise meaning in its
generic sense. But when used in insurance contracts it may have
a meaning varying from such an illogical definition as "animal-
drawn equipment" to that of a private-passenger automobile as
recognized in the modern age. And by specific definition, the term
may include many types of vehicles not included in the generic
meaning. In some insurance contracts the term is defined care-
fully, and here there may be little disagreement in interpretation.
In others the term is not defined at all, or the definition is so broad
that any attempt to determine the meaning with any degree of pre-
cision leads to substantial disagreement.
We shall be concerned with the generic meaning only as it
would be applied in those insurance contracts in which the word
"automobile" is not defined. Our major interest involves inter-
pretation of the term as it is used in various insurance contracts,
and particularly in those in which the meaning is subject to sub-
stantial confusion and disagreement. We shall not attempt to con-
sider all the uses of the term in these insurance contracts, but
only those which in our opinion are of sufficient importance to
justify analysis. We shall consider the term in its generic sense
and then in six of its insurance contract uses: general insurance
contract definition, temporary substitute automobile, non-owned au-
tomobile, automobile furnished for regular use, trailer, and equip-
ment of an automobile.
I. GENERIC MEANING
When the term "automobile" is used in a general sense, i.e.,
without specific definition as in an insurance contract, it embraces
perhaps all motor vehicles designed for use on roads or highways
for the conveyance of persons or property. Black defines the term
"automobile" as "a vehicle for the transportation of persons or
property on the highway, carrying its own motive power and not
operated upon fixed tracks."1 This definition is broad and could
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1 BLACK, LAw DIcTIoNAY (4th ed. 1951). See also Jernigan v. Hanover
Fire Ins. Co., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952), for an excellent dis-
cussion and definition of the meaning of the term.
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encompass practically all those land motor vehicles designed to
transport persons or property on streets and highways. It would
include private passenger automobiles, trucks of all kinds, buses,
and the like, and could include motorcycles and motor scooters.
However, there has been a distinct trend in the courts to exclude
motorcycles, and perhaps motor scooters, from the generic use of
the term. For example, in the case of Jernigan v. Hanover Fire
Ins. Co.,2 a motorcycle was held not to be an automobile. In con-
sidering the meaning of the term the court stated that "the term
automobile in the general sense embraces all motor vehicles ex-
cept motorcycles, designed for use on highways for conveyance of
persons or property, and in the particular sense it includes such
motor vehicles, other than motorcycles, as are intended for use on
highways for carriage of persons only." Other decisions, of which
Beeler v. Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers Ins. Co.3 is typi-
cal, also indicate that a motorcycle is not an automobile within the
generic meaning of the term. In addition, self-propelled golf carts,
farm-type tractors, and most of the self-propelled equipment of
contractors and farmers are not included in the generic definition,
because they are not designed for use on highways and streets.
However, it is important to note that the generic meaning may be
qualified by specific definition in a contract. For example, in
insurance policies the term "automobile" by definition may be
more restricted than the generic meaning or may be substantially
broader. Here the generic definition will be applicable only if
there is nothing to the contrary in the insurance-contract definition.
III. THE GENERAL INSURANCE CONTRACT DEFINITION
The term "automobile" has many different meanings in insur-
ance policies, although there has been a recent tendency to bring
the definitions more in line with the generic meaning of the term.
Since careful attention must be given to the definition in the spe-
cific contract involved, it is desirable at this point to review some
of the more important definitions.
In the family automobile policy,4 which is probably the broad-
est and the most extensively used contract for the purpose of
2 Jernigan v. Hanover Fire Ins. Co., 235 N.C. 334, 69 S.E.2d 847 (1952).
3 48 Tenn. App. 370, 346 S.W.2d 457 (1960). See also LeCroy v. Nation-
wide Ins. Co., 251 N.C. 19, 110 S.E.2d 463 (1959); Mittelsteadt v. Bovee,
9 Wis.2d 44, 100 N.W.2d 376 (1960); Paupst v. McKendry, 180 Pa. Super.
646, 145 A.2d 725 (1958).
4 The policies used here as illustrations are those formulated by the
National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters and the National Automo-
bile Underwriters Association, and are those used by most property and
casualty insurance companies today.
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insuring individually owned private passenger automobiles, the
term is not defined in any sense. This obviously was not an over-
sight, but was intended to provide a meaning at least comparable
to the generic use of the term. In the family policy, then, it is
highly debatable whether a motorcycle could be considered an
automobile for any purpose in the contract, e.g., an owned, a non-
owned, or a temporary substitute automobile. In the special auto-
mobile policy, on the other hand, the formulators of the contract
intended to be more precise. Here the automobile is defined as
meaning "a four wheel vehicle designed for use principally upon
public roads." This leaves no doubt concerning the status of a
motorcycle or a motor scooter in the special policy. In the basic
automobile policy6 the term more nearly approximates the generic
meaning. It is defined as "the motor vehicle described in this
policy." It is possible, then, that the described automobile could
include a motorcycle or motor scooter.
In the garage liability policy, the term "automobile" has a
uniquely broad meaning. The term includes "a land motor vehicle
or trailer, other land equipment capable of moving under its own
power, equipment for use therewith, and animal drawn equip-
ment." Here an automobile could be private passenger, a truck of
any kind, a bulldozer, a house trailer, a self-propelled combine,
and even a farm wagon. The reason for the broad definition,
however, is not difficult to determine. This policy is designed for
a type of business in which many different types of equipment
could involve the insured in legal liability. The least complicated
approach would be that of defining the term "automobile" with a
broad rather than a restricted meaning.
In those policies that are normally included in the category of
general liability,6 a definition of the term "automobile" is neces-
sary because automobile liability is excluded completely or is ex-
cluded in cases in which an accident occurs away from the premises
or the ways immediately adjoining the premises. These contracts
must be specific with respect to what is excluded. In the compre-
hensive personal liability policy an automobile is defined as "a
land motor vehicle, trailer or semitrailer; but the term 'automo-
bile' does not include, except while being towed by or carried on
an automobile, any of the following: any crawler or farm-type
5 This is the traditional contract used today for the insuring of many
types of private passenger automobiles as well as trucks, buses, etc.
6 These are mainly contracts involving liability arising from premises-
operations, such as the owners', landlords' and tenants', manufacturers'
and contractors', comprehensive general, comprehensive personal and
comprehensive personal farm liability policies.
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tractor, farm implement or, if not subject to motor vehicle registra-
tion, any equipment which is designed for use principally off pub-
lic roads."' 7 Here the term "automobile" must be interpreted in
much the same manner as in its generic use. While a farm-type
tractor and a self-propelled golf cart would be covered, motor-
cycles and motor scooters will be excluded.
In the older general liability insurance policies involving lia-
bility insurance for business operations, the term "automobile"
was defined as "a land motor vehicle, trailer, or semitrailer."
The definition also encompassed, and thereby excluded from cover-
age, certain types of mobile equipment while being operated on
streets and highways solely for purposes of locomotion, such as a
power shovel with wheels and rubber tires, even though this equip-
ment was not designed to be used on roads and streets.
Recently, however, some rather substantial changes were made
in the general liability contracts and one of these was a new defini-
tion of automobile. It is now defined as "a land motor vehicle,
trailer or semitrailer designed for travel on public roads (including
any machinery or apparatus attached thereto), but does not include
mobile equipment." Mobile equipment, which includes most of
that used by a building or road contractor, will now be covered in
its entirety8 under general liability policies and not partially under
general liability and partially under automobile-liability contracts,
as was the case under the former definition. The new definition
has the result of bringing the meaning of the term "automobile"
in general-liability contracts more in line with the generic defini-
tion of the term.
Two recent changes in the automobile medical-payments and
uninsured-motorists coverages involve a change in the traditional
definition of the automobile. First, in the customary automobile
medical-payments insurance, indemnity was formerly payable to
the insured who sustained bodily injury while occupying an
owned automobile, while occupying certain non-owned automobiles,
and through being struck by an automobile. In the family auto-
mobile policy, for example, the term "automobile" would be com-
parable with the generic use of the term, and could exclude a motor-
cycle. By means of a specific exclusion, however, the medical-
payments coverage on the owned automobile would not be appli-
7 This definition is similar to that in the comprehensive personal farm
liability policy.
8 However, automobile insurance must be utilized for legal liability aris-
ing in those cases in which such equipment is carried on or towed by
an automobile, even under the new definition.
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cable for bodily injury sustained while occupying an automobile
owned by a relative who is a resident of the named insured's
household. This would mean that should the father have medical-
payments coverage on his automobile, this coverage would not be
applicable to the father while he is occupying his son's uninsured
automobile. Nor would the son have any coverage from his father's
insurance for injuries sustained while he was occupying his own
automobile. But if the son should purchase a motorcycle, and
while operating the vehicle, be struck by an automobile, indemnity
for his bodily injuries could be recovered under his father's medi-
cal-payments insurance. The exclusion would not apply because he
was not occupying an automobile. This may have all the appear-
ances of complete absurdity, and insurance adjusters may argue
that this was never intended. However, a greater degree of pre-
cision in definition could have avoided this complication.
The result is essentially the same in the traditional uninsured-
motorists coverage. For example, if the son in the above example
were operating his uninsured motorcycle and was struck by an
uninsured automobile, he could collect indemnity under his father's
uninsured-motorists insurance in spite of the fact that this insur-
ance is not applicable to an automobile or trailer owned by a resi-
dent of the same household as the named insured. A motorcycle
may not be an automobile. If so, the son was not occupying an
automobile.
In order to avoid this apparently unintended result, the new
insuring agreements for medical-payments and uninsured-motor-
ists insurance exclude coverage for bodily injuries sustained while
occupying a highway vehicle owned by any insured. The medical-
payments insurance also limits coverage through being "struck by a
highway vehicle" only to the insured in his status as a pedestrian.
A "highway vehicle" is defined as a "land motor vehicle or trailer."
Since the definition is broader than the term "automobile," it fol-
lows that it could include a motorcycle. This would then exclude
coverage for the son in the above examples. Since it is contem-
plated that all automobile policies containing coverage for medical
payments and uninsured motorists will eventually contain these
new insuring agreements, this will eliminate a source of payments
in many existing policies that could become widespread because of
the growing popularity of motorcycles.
IV. TEMPORARY SUBSTITUTE AUTOMOBILE
All three automobile policies referred to previously provide
coverage beyond the owned or described automobile, for the use of
a "temporary substitute" automobile. In the family policy the term
8 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 46, NO. 1 (1967)
"temporary substitute" is defined to mean, "any automobile or
trailer, not owned by the named insured, while temporarily used
with the permission of the owner as a substitute for the owned
automobile or trailer when withdrawn from normal use because of
its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction." The defini-
tions in the special and the basic policies are essentially the same,
except that in the special policy a temporary substitute cannot
include an automobile owned by the named insured or any resi-
dent of the same household. 9
The major concern here is the interpretation of that portion of
the definition of a temporary substitute automobile involving "any
automobile." Just how far will this concept extend? If the named
insured, for example, should borrow a mix-in-transit cement truck
to use temporarily while his own automobile is being repaired,
would this truck be a temporary substitute and would all the cov-
erages on the owned automobile, including comprehensive and col-
lision, be applicable to the truck? The answer is "Yes." As long
as the temporary substitute vehicle falls within the definition of
the term "automobile," coverage will be applicable.
In our analysis of the cases involved, and in the absence of a
definition to the contrary, "temporary substitute automobile" falls
within the generic meaning of the term "automobile." For exam-
ple, in the case of Mittelsteadt v. Bovee referred to above, the
specific question involved a motorcycle. Here the defendant's
automobile was temporarily out of service for repairs, and the de-
fendant was using a motorcycle to make a trip because of the un-
availability of his automobile. The court referred to the use of the
term "automobile" in all sections of the defendant's insurance pol-
icy and concluded that "the motorcycle is not an automobile as
defined under the terms and definitions contained in the policy, and
therefore fails to qualify as a temporary substitute automobile."
The court also reaches the same conclusion in the Paupst v. Mc-
Kendry case mentioned above.10
9 In the family and the basic policies, an automobile owned by a resi-
dent relative could be a temporary substitute.
There are differences in the application of the insurance coverage
to the temporary substitute automobile, even though the definitions
are essentially the same. For example, in the family and special poli-
cies, all coverages on the insured automobile, including physical dam-
age, will apply to the temporary substitute automobile as excess in-
surance. But in the basic policy, only the liability and medical pay-
ments coverages would be applicable to the temporary substitute.
10 Here the court even held that the use of the words "motor vehicle"
in defining the automobile covered did not extend the ordinary mean-
ing to include a motorcycle. It pointed out that the operation of
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It is reasonable to assume that if the definition of "temporary
substitute" includes any automobile, then any motor vehicle that
qualifies under the generic meaning of the term can be a temporary
substitute automobile. A case in point is Brown v. Security Fire
& Indem. Co." in which the court held that a sawmill truck
used temporarily as a substitute for the insured automobile was a
temporary substitute automobile.
In most of the cases in which the definition of a temporary
substitute automobile has been involved, the most important ques-
tion has been that of what constitutes "withdrawal from normal
use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruc-
tion." Does a flat tire constitute breakdown of the insured auto-
mobile? This was the specific question in Caldwell v. Hartford
Acc. & Indem. Co.-2 Here the court held that an automobile be-
longing to the wife of the insured was a temporary substitute
automobile within the meaning of the provisions of his policy when
he used the car to make a trip because his own automobile had a
flat tire. In Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Gonzalez, however, an automobile
was not a temporary substitute where the insured automobile was
not in good running order and was left at home for the owner's
son to drive around town.1 3 And an automobile which a son hoped
to purchase to replace his own car which had not been in operating
condition for a considerable time was not a temporary substitute
automobile within the terms of the policy issued to the father cov-
ering the family automobile.1 4 In other cases involving the same
question, the courts reach essentially the same conclusions. 15
motorcycles entails a greater danger of accident than an ordinary
automobile and that it was unlikely that the insurer intended to assume
such a risk.
In a few decisions, however, of which Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co.
v. Come, 100 N.H. 177, 123 A.2d 267 (1956), is an example, the court
held that a motorcycle was an automobile in a policy that incorporated
by reference the Financial Responsibility Act of a state. The act used
the term "motor vehicles" and the court said that the term "automo-
bile" must be construed as equivalent to the statutory words "motor
vehicle" and hence a non-owned motorcycle would be covered by the
policy, although there was no coverage of the insured's own motorcycle.
11 244 F. Supp. 299, 304 (D. Va. 1965).
12 248 MAss. 767, 776-77, 160 So. 2d 209, 212-13 (1964).
13 358 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962).
14 Ellis Elec. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 153 So. 2d 905, 909 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
15 See Grundeen v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 238 F.2d 750, 753 (8th
Cir. 1956); Densmore v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 221 F. Supp. 652,
654 (W.D. Pa. 1963); Central Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Sisneros, 173 F. Supp. 757
(D.N.VL 1959); Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Banks, 275 Ala. 119, 122,
152 So. 2d 666, 670 (1963); Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. Addy, 132 Colo. 202,
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V. NON-OWNED AUTOMOBILE
All automobile policies provide in some measure that the in-
surance coverage on the owned or described automobile will be ap-
plicable for legal liability arising from the insured's operation or
occupancy of a "non-owned automobile." A non-owned automo-
bile is customarily defined as "an automobile or trailer not owned
by or furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or
any relative, other than a temporary substitute automobile." Both
the family and the special policies also require that the non-owned
automobile 1) be operated with the permission of the owner and
2) that it be operated within the scope of the permission granted.
Few court decisions are available for the interpretation of the term
because the policies are relatively precise in their definitions and
exclusions.
A problem that sometimes arises concerning interpretation of
the contract provisions is one that some insurance adjusters refer
to as "pyramiding of the insurance coverage." This concerns the
application of the insurance coverage, for example the liability lim-
its, from the owned automobile or automobiles to legal liability
arising from the operation of a legitimate non-owned automobile.
In the experience of the author there is some confusion among
adjusters and others in this application of the insurance to a non-
owned automobile. While this does not involve a legal interpreta-
tion of the meaning of non-owned automobile, it is a feature of the
automobile insurance policy about which there should be no ex-
cuse for misinterpretation.
As an example, let us assume that the insured owns three au-
tomobiles and that he has purchased 50/100/50,000 dollar limits of
liability insurance on each automobile, all from the same insurance
carrier. He borrows an automobile from a friend and the friend
has 50/100/50,000 dollar limits of liability coverage also. While op-
erating the non-owned automobile, the named insured sustains a se-
rious accident for which he is legally liable. The primary insurance
will be that on the friend's automobile. In both the family and the
basic policies the total of all three limits on the owned automobiles
will be applicable to the accident as excess insurance. There is
nothing in the policies that will prevent the application of the
limits in this manner. This is not an unjustified pyramiding of the
insurance as some uninitiated adjusters would be inclined to be-
286 P.2d 622 (1955); Davidson v. Firemen's Fund Indem. Co., 4 App.
Div. 2d 759, 760, 165 N.Y.S.2d 598, 600 (2d Dep't 1957); Ranson v. Fidel-
ity & Cas. Co., 250 N.C. 60, 64, 108 S.E.2d 22, 25 (1959); Lewis v. Brad-
ley, 7 Wis. 2d 586, 591-92, 97 N.W.2d 408, 411-12 (1959); DeMarco v.
Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 153 So. 2d 594, 597 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
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ieve.16 The only instance in which the so-called pyramiding of
coverage would be inapplicable would be one in which the named
insured operates an owned uninsured automobile or an automobile
owned by a relative residing in his household. Because the defini-
tion of non-owned automobile excludes automobiles owned by the
named insured or relatives residing in his household, it is obvious
that if the insured has three automobiles and has liability insur-
ance only on one car, this coverage would not be applicable to an
accident arising in the operation of either of the other two auto-
mobiles.
In the absence of a definition of the term "automobile," it is
reasonable to assume that a non-owned automobile must fall within
the generic meaning of the term. Therefore, in the family automo-
bile policy, a motorcycle perhaps could not be a non-owned auto-
mobile. Under certain circumstances, however, a truck could be a
legitimate non-owned car. For example, if the named insured bor-
rows a two-ton truck and uses this vehicle for non-business pur-
poses, the truck will be a legitimate non-owned automobile and the
liability and medical payments coverages from his owned automo-
bile will apply in an accident involving the truck.
There are a few decisions involving the question of ownership
versus non-ownership. In Garlick v. McFarland7 the court held
that an automobile technically may be considered non-owned until
title is vested either as legal owner or as registered owner. The
words "owner" and "ownership" as used in an automobile liability
policy are to be construed and applied as those words are defined
in statutes relating to title to automobiles, in the absence of lan-
guage in the policy prescribing a different meaning for such terms.
This same conclusion appears to be the majority opinion in other
cases involving the question of ownership.' 8 Thus an automobile
for which the entire consideration has been paid to the seller who
gave possession thereof to the buyer was a non-owned automobile
under the buyer's liability policy extending coverage to the opera-
tions of a non-owned automobile by the named insured or any rela-
18 Because of a condition in the special automobile policy, there is a
restriction of the application of the insurance from an owned auto-
mobile to a non-owned automobile. Here, if the insurance coverage
on the three owned automobiles was in the same insurance carrier,
then only the highest applicable limit of liability or benefit under
one policy would be applicable to the non-owned car.
17 159 Ohio St. 539, 544-46, 113 N.E.2d 92, 95 (1953).
is See Matsuo Yoshida v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 240 F.2d 824, 827 (9th
Cir. 1957); Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Guthiel, 2 N.Y.2d 584, 587-88, 141 N.E.2d
909, 912 (1957); Pioneer Mut. Comp. Co. v. Diaz, 178 S.W.2d 121, 123
(Tex. Civ. App. 1943); Oil Base Inc. v. Transport Indem. Co., 143 Cal.
App.2d 453, 463-64, 299 P.2d 952, 959 (1956).
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tive, where the seller had not signed a transfer on the certificate of
title and no new certificate of title to the automobile had been is-
sued to the buyer.19 And an automobile which an unemancipated
and unmarried minor had purported to purchase and which he was
driving when he became involved in a collision while returning it
to the seller pursuant to his father's directions was a non-owned
automobile within his father's automobile liability policy covering
the family automobile. 20
A few cases involving non-owned automobiles have been con-
cerned with the definition of the term "relative." A problem arises
because of the exclusion of automobiles owned by a relative in the
definition of "non-owned automobile." While the cases are not
necessarily conclusive, it would appear that the definition of a
"relative" as "one related to and a resident of the named insured's
household" will be applied literally. Thus, in Carr v. Home Indem.
Co. the court stated that an automobile belonging to the insured's
brother, who was a member of her household, was not covered by
her policy as a non-owned automobile. 21 And in American Cas.
Co. v. Crook,22 the court held that a brother-in-law who had re-
sided in the insured's household for several months in 1959 but
only three or four days before the named insured's son was in-
volved in an accident while driving his uncle's automobile was not
a resident of the household. Therefore, to the son the uncle's auto-
mobile would be a legitimate non-owned automobile.
Vr. AUTOMOBILE FURNISHED FOR REGULAR USE
Most automobile insurance contracts provide coverage for lia-
bility arising from the use or maintenance of non-owned automo-
biles, but with a number of important qualifications. Perhaps
the most important restriction, and the one causing the most diffi-
culty, is the exclusion of coverage for automobiles furnished for
the regular use of the named insured or a relative. In the family
automobile policy, a non-owned automobile does not include one
"furnished for the regular use of either the named insured or any
relative." The framers of the special automobile policy were more
precise in their exclusion. Here a non-owned automobile does not
include one "furnished or available for the regular use of either the
named insured or any resident of the same household. '23 Although
19 Colbrese v. National Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co., 227 F. Supp. 978,
982 (D. Mont. 1964).
20 Ellis Elec. Co. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 153 So. 2d 905, 910 (La. Ct. App. 1963).
21 404 Pa. 27, 170 A.2d 588 (1961).
22 197 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.W.Va. 1961).
23 Emphasis added.
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the insertion of the words "available for" adds clarity to the intent
of the definition, the courts, as will be discovered later, have been
inclined to interpret the exclusion in this manner even in the fam-
ily and the basic policies. What constitutes "furnished fdr regu-
lar use" or "furnished or available for regular use" has long been
a source of dispute. A number of court decisions have clarified
some aspects of the problem, yet many issues still exist.
One of the most important interpretations of the expression has
made the right of the insured to use an automobile determinative
rather than the number of times he actually uses it. For example,
the author is a member of the faculty of the University of Ne-
braska. The university has a fleet of automobiles, any one of
which a faculty member may use in university business under cer-
tain circumstances. Is a university automobile then furnished for
the regular use of a faculty member? If so, the faculty member's
own automobile insurance contract would not be applicable to an
accident involving the use of the university automobile. Is it nec-
essary that the faculty member use the university automobile fre-
quently for the exclusion to apply?24 These questions may be an-
swered with some degree of assurance. For example, in Farm Bu-
reau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Marr,2 5 the insured worked for a govern-
ment office under the usual arrangement of using whatever auto-
mobile was available when he needed one. His own policy was held
not to apply to an accident which occurred while he was driving a
pool automobile. Therefore, any automobile available to the insured
may be considered furnished for regular use. This means also that
the automobile furnished does not need to be a specific automobile.
A similar conclusion is reached in the older case of Farm Bureau
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Boecher,26 where the insured was employed
by an automobile sales agency and had not previously driven the
particular automobile involved in the accident. The same result
was obtained in Moore v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,27 in which
the insured drove some automobile regularly in his work, but not
the same one each day. In each of these cases, the fact that some
automobile was available to the named insured was held sufficient
to make the particular one used at the time of the accident an
automobile "furnished for regular use." This means that the right
of use is apparently more important to the courts than the num-
24 Whether the automobile is or is not furnished for regular use could
be an important problem to an employee in those instances in which
the employer does not insure his automobiles.
25 128 F. Supp. 67 (D.N.J. 1955).
26 37 Ohio L. Abs. 553, 48 N.E.2d 895 (Ct. App. 1942).
27 239 Miss. 130, 121 So. 2d 125 (1960).
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ber of times the insured actually used the furnished automobile. 28
In Voelker v. Travelers Indem. Co., 29 a federal appellate court
held that even a military vehicle driven by the insured, a national
guardsman, in the line of duty, must be considered to be furnished
for his regular use, although he apparently had not driven that
particular automobile previously. This case, however, went one
step further, in that it also held that the insured's duties with the
National Guard were a part of his business or occupation, although
like most guardsmen, he had other regular employment, partici-
pating in guard activities once a week and during annual encamp-
ment. This decision could have an important bearing on the use of
a non-owned automobile by the named insured for business pur-
poses. Perhaps one may conclude that business purposes could
include part-time activities, other than the insured's regular occu-
pation, so long as they are activities which involve remuneration
for their performance.
In some cases the court has possibly gone to an extreme in
order to hold for coverage. But these cases have been few and
far between. For example, in Pacific Auto. Ins. Co. v. Lewis,30 the
insured regularly drove an automobile of his employer during the
day and was involved in an accident while using the same automo-
bile, with special permission of his employer, on an errand that
evening. The court held the employee's insurance coverage ap-
plicable on the ground that the automobile, although furnished for
the regular use of the insured, was not being employed in this
"regular use" at the time of the accident.
Most of the decisions have involved employer's automobiles
furnished to employees. However, the "furnished for regular use"
may also involve a personal relationship rather than that of em-
ployer-employee. For example, if an automobile belonging to a
friend is made available for the insured to use at any time he
needs the car, would this automobile be one furnished for the in-
sured's regular use? This could be the case, although there are
few court decisions that have involved this situation. In Lincombe
v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,31 an automobile which a dealer
28 See also Moore v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 239 Miss. 130, 121 So. 2d
125 (1960); Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 325 Ill. App.
576, 60 N.E.2d 269 (1945); Dickerson v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 139
So. 2d 785 (La. Ct. App. 1962).
29 260 F.2d 275 (7th Cir. 1958).
80 56 Cal.App.2d 597, 132 P.2d 846 (1943). See also Schoenknecht v.
Prairie State Farmers Ins. Ass'n, 27 Ill.App.2d 83, 169 N.E.2d 148 (1960).
31 166 So. 2d 920, 924 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
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furnished for her regular use until delivery of her new automo-
bile was not considered one furnished for her regular use, but was
considered to be a non-owned automobile. However, in a situation
in which the insured had unrestricted use of his sister's automo-
bile, for which he had temporarily exchanged his own (the in-
sured) automobile for the sister's benefit, the court held that the
sister's automobile was furnished to the insured for his regular
use within the exclusion of the insured's policy.3 2 And in Camp-
bell v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co.,33 where a father received pos-
session of an automobile for his regular use when he gave up
possession of another automobile to his son, and he had no other
automobile for the personal use of himself and his family, the auto-
mobile which the father was V~sing was held furnished for his regu-
lar use. His policy was therefore not applicable to an accident
which occurred while operating this automobile. In a similar deci-
sion, the court held that an automobile provided the insured for
his regular use by his mother-in-law came within the exclusion of
the policy excluding automobiles furnished for regular use of the
named insured.3 4 And in Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Johnson,35 where
incident to purchase of a new automobile the insured sold an old
car to his son for a nominal price as part of an understanding that
the father could continue to use the automobile along with the son,
the insurance company was held not liable to the insured for a
loss suffered by the insured arising out of an accident which oc-
curred while the insured's wife was operating the son's automobile,
because the automobile was furnished for the regular use of the
named insured.
While these decisions do not establish a precise set of criteria,
they do suggest that a personal relationship involving the furnish-
ing of an automobile may in some instances involve the exclusion
of an automobile furnished for regular use of the named insured
or a relative.
There is one additional situation in which the exclusion of au-
tomobiles furnished for regular use may apply, and this involves
rented autoniobiles. Here the question arises as to whether a short-
term rental amounts to regular use and is consequently subject
to the furnished-for-regular-use exclusion. In the only decision to
come to our attention, it was held that a three-week rental of an
82 Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Hiland, 349 F.2d 376, 377, 378 (7th Cir.
1965).
83 211 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1954).
84 Aler v. Travelers Indem. Co., 92 F. Supp. 620 (D. Md. 1950).
85 134 F. Supp. 156 (D. Minn. 1955), rev'd, 238 F.2d 322 (8th Cir. 1956).
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automobile did not constitute regular use.3 6 Perhaps the casual
renting of automobiles, i.e., for one or two days on a business trip,
vacation, and the like, does not constitute regular use. However,
there may be a possibility that frequent rentals for extended pe-
riods such as several weeks could be interpreted as regular use and
coverage thus excluded from the insured's own automobile policy.
VII. TRAILERS
Practically all automobile insurance contracts include trailers
in their definition of the term "automobile." However, the defini-
tion of the term "trailer" either appears nowhere in the contract or
the definition is somewhat inconclusive. For example, in the fam-
ily automobile policy a trailer means "a trailer designed for use
with a private passenger automobile, if not being used for business
or commercial purposes with other than a private passenger, farm
or utility automobile, or a farm wagon or farm implement while
used with a farm automobile." This policy does not require that
the trailer be attached to the automobile in order that coverage be
applicable, except for the farm wagon and farm implement while
used with a farm automobile. The term in the family policy then
would include a house trailer and all the other vehicles that may
be included in the concept of trailers, so long as they are designed
to be used with a private passenger automobile. The special policy
is more restrictive in its definition, in that only trailers of the
utility type are included automatically. This has the effect of
excluding home, office, store, display, or passenger trailers. Auto-
matic coverage is applicable to utility-type trailers also, but only
when the trailer is used with an insured automobile. The defini-
tion in the basic policy is similar to that of the special, except that
there is no requirement in the basic that the trailer be used with
the insured automobile. In the general liability policies, the term
"trailer" is not defined at all. The definition of the term "automo-
bile" includes a trailer or semitrailer designed for travel on public
roads.
The automobile policies provide scant evidence of the physical
nature of a trailer. In its generic meaning, Black defines trailer as
"a separate vehicle, not drawn or propelled by its own power,
but drawn by some independent power." He also defines a semi-
trailer as "a separate vehicle which is not driven or propelled by
its own power, but which, to be useful, must be attached to and
become a part of another vehicle, and then loses its identity as a
86 Factory Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of America v. Continental Cas. Co., 267
F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1959).
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separate vehicle. 37 These definitions have some merit, but do not
define the terms with the degree of precision necessary for their
application in automobile insurance contracts. For instance, would
a concrete-mixing machine mounted on wheels and drawn behind
a private passenger automobile be considered a trailer? If it is
included in the meaning of a vehicle, then the answer could be
"Yes," according to the generic definition. However, one could
argue reasonably that it is not a vehicle. Its function certainly is
not that of carrying or conveying persons or property, but that of
making concrete. If the function of carrying persons or property
is required (and this requirement seems reasonable) then a large
sled towed by an automobile would come closer to being a trailer
than the cement-mixing machine.
The little discussion of the physical characteristics of a "trailer"
from court decisions has involved mainly an exclusion in the basic
automobile policy, which states that the policy does not apply under
the liability section of the contract "while the automobile is used
for the towing of any trailer owned or hired by the insured and
not covered by like insurance in the company; or while any trailer
covered by this policy is used with any automobile owned or hired
by the insured and not covered by like insurance in the com-
pany."38  This exclusion is extremely important because, for ex-
ample, if an insured should tow a trailer behind a truck in a busi-
ness operation, not even the liability coverage on the truck would
be applicable, unless the insured had purchased liability insurance
on the trailer from the same company. It becomes important, then,
to determine precisely the physical characteristics that make some-
thing a trailer.
The few court decisions available are quite helpful. They es-
tablish rather conclusively that an automobile being towed behind
another automobile is not a trailer within the meaning of the ex-
clusionary clause in the automobile policy. For example, in Safe-
guard Ins. Co. v. Justice,39 the court held that there is nothing in
the policy that states that a towed automobile is a trailer. It is
not a trailer in common parlance. In another case, the court
held that the towing of a temporarily disabled automobile to a re-
pair shop did-not fall within the exclusionary clause because a
87 BLACK, LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
88 However, this exclusion is not applicable to utility-type' trailers that
are being towed by private passenger automobiles or being towed be-
hind other types of automobiles and not being used for business pur-
poses.
89 203 Va. 972, 128 S.E.2d 286 (1962).
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disabled automobile is not a trailer.40 In practically all the cases
involving the towing of automobiles, the court was more con-
cerned with the purpose of the towing rather than the physical
characteristics of the object being towed. While the function of
an automobile is that of carrying persons or property, it does not
have this function if it is a racing car that is being towed to some
place where it can perform its function of racing, nor does it have
this function if it has broken down and is being towed to a garage
for repairs. Thus, to be a trailer, one may conclude that, in the
absence of definition to the contrary, the conveyance must have a
use of transporting or carrying persons or property, and must not
be towed with some other purpose in mind.
Several decisions involved specifically the towing of certain
equipment behind an automobile. In one case,41 a concrete mixer
which was attached to a truck at the time of the injury was not a
trailer within the exclusionary clause of the policy on the truck.
And in McConnell v. Underwriters at Lloyds of London,42 the court
held that a portable air compressor was not a trailer, and also
held that coverage was applicable from the truck policy when the
air compressor came loose due to negligence and struck an ap-
proaching automobile. These cases support our general conclusion
concerning the purpose or function of the object being towed.
However, it is dangerous to consider the problem as settled, be-
cause in Moffit v. State Auto Ins. Ass'n,48 a hay grinder mounted
on four wheels while being drawn by a truck on a public highway
was held to be a trailer within the meaning of the exclusionary
clause of the automobile insurance on the truck. In spite of the
Moffit decision, it seems reasonable that in order to be a trailer
the object towed must serve the primary function of transporting or
carrying persons or property.
Problems may arise in automobile insurance policies involving
house or home trailers. 44 The few cases involving the definition
of a house trailer are not conclusive. In Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hoff-
40 Littlefield v. Phoenix Indem. Ins. Co., 86 N.H. 87, 163 Atl. 420 (1932).
See also Eastern Trans. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Cas. Co., 101 N.H. 407, 144
A.2d 911 (1958).
41 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Aguayo, 29 F. Supp. 561 (S.D. Cal. 1939).
42 16 Cal. Rptr. 362, 365 P.2d 418 (1961).
43 140 Neb. 578, 300 N.W. 837 (1941).
44 It is important to determine whether a vehicle is or is not a house
trailer, because both the special and basic policies do not provide
automatic liability and medical payments coverage for house trailers.
And in the family policy, coverage automatically is provided. However,
medical payments coverage would not be applicable when the vehicle
becomes located as a residence or premises,
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man,45 the court concluded that whether a trailer is a "home trailer"
within the automobile policy depends not upon the size of facilities
of the trailer but on whether the trailer is the dwelling place of a
person or persons, and the trailer does not become a home merely
because such person stays there only two or three nights a year.
And in Pothier v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co.,46 it was held that an
automobile liability insurance policy covering a trailer does not
cover a trailer of sufficient size for living purposes, which is fully
enclosed, equipped with a window and door, furnished with a cot,
and obviously designed for the comfort of the occupants, although
it contains no facilities for cooking or eating. Here the court was
more interested in the physical characteristics of the vehicle than
in the use of it as in the Maryland case. In a third case, the court
was concerned both with the physical characteristics and with the
use of the vehicle. Here, in Maryland Cas. Co. v. Hoffman,47 the
insured had a small trailer with windows, containing a bed, cook-
ing equipment, and other furnishings. He used it on a trip pri-
marily to carry baggage, not cooking in it, and sleeping in it only
occasionally. In an action involving a medical-payments claim for
injuries incurred while the trailer was being used for sleeping pur-
poses, the court held that the vehicle was a camp trailer and not a
home trailer, and hence the claim was covered.
While these cases still leave considerable doubt as to the defini-
tion of a home trailer, they at least provide evidence that either
the physical characteristics of the vehicle or the actual use at the
time of the accident will be important determining factors.
VIII. THE EQUIPMENT OF THE AUTOMOBILE
One of the most perplexing problems in automobile insurance
today is that of determining the equipment that may be considered
a part of an automobile. Automobile policies all provide in the
definition of the term "automobile" that equipment of the auto-
mobile is included. For example, in the family automobile policy
the term "automobile" is defined in the physical-damage section of
the contract as "the automobile, including its equipment." In the
basic automobile policy the definition of the term is somewhat more
meaningful. Here the term "automobile" includes its equipment
and other equipment permanently attached thereto. In general
liability contracts the term "automobile" is defined to include any
machinery or apparatus attached thereto. In none of these, how-
45 75 Ariz. 103, 252 P.2d 82 (1952).
40 192 F.2d 425 (4th Cir. 1951).
47 75 Ariz. 103, 252 P.2d 82 (1952).
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ever, is the term "equipment" actually defined.
It should be obvious that substantial differences of opinion
will arise in an attempt to determine precisely what equipment is
or is not included. As mentioned above, the basic policy, which is
the oldest of the three contracts included in this discussion, pro-
vides more evidence of the meaning of the term than the others,
in that it specifies not only equipment but other equipment per-
manently attached thereto. For example, it is possible that the
jack, the chains, and car tools would be considered as equipment.
In addition, since the radio and the stereo are permanently at-
tached to the car, they would also be equipment. A camper unit
attached to a truck body could also be equipment of the automo-
bile, as well as the equipment of a mix-in-transit cement truck,
well-drilling equipment, and the like. In the later policies, i.e.,
the family and the special auto policies, the phrase "other equip-
ment permanently attached thereto" has been deleted. Does this
mean that the framers of these contracts intended the term
"equipment" to be broader or narrower than its use in the basic
automobile policy?
The few court decisions available provide us with little guid-
ance. For example, in Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Kolmer,48 the court
held that the theft of a rectifier used in charging the battery of
an electric automobile was covered, notwithstanding the fact that
the rectifier was not attached to the automobile nor carried with
it, but was kept in the garage. Here the court considered the
term "equipment" to include anything needed for efficient action
or service. In State v. Royal,49 the court ruled that a jack is
equipment within the meaning of the term "automobile." And in
Banks v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 50 the court went so far
as to include a tarpaulin used to cover the cargo on a truck as
equipment of the truck. It should be noted, however, that the loss
occurred when the tarpaulin was stretched over the load of the
truck. In the case of Moore v. American Ins. Co.,51 the court held
that the policy did not cover a concrete mixer installed on the
chassis of a truck after issuance of the policy. Here the court
said that the term "its equipment and other equipment permanent-
ly attached thereto" meant equipment permanently attached at the
time of the issuance of the policy. The court would perhaps have
48 78 Ind. App. 479, 136 N.E. 51 (1922).
49 66 N.M. 416, 349 P.2d 332 (1960).
50 131 Neb. 266, 267 N.W. 454 (1936).
51 81 Ga. App. 219, 58 S.E.2d 197 (1950). See also Drexler Motor Co. v.
Bruce, 95 So. 2d 207 (La. Ct. App. 1957); Boston Ins. Co. v. Wade, 203
Miss. 469, 35 So. 2d 523 (1948).
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considered it equipment had the concrete mixer been on the truck
at the inception of the contract. The other cases involved damage
to or destruction of parts and equipment removed from automo-
biles in cases in which the automobiles were torn down for re-
pairs. These parts were held to be covered regardless of a require-
ment that the equipment be permanently attached to the automo-
bile.5 2
From these decisions one may conclude that equipment needed
for the efficient action or service of the automobile, and other
equipment that is permanently attached thereto, may be considered
part of the automobile. While they do provide some evidence
of the nature of equipment, a rigorous, clearcut definition is still
lacking. Equipment obviously would include articles such as tire-
changing tools, spare tires, tire chains, floor mats, and the like.
With respect to trucks, however, it is doubtful that shovels, chutes,
and articles used in the loading and unloading of the truck would
be considered equipment necessary to the operation of the truck.
As to the number of tools and spare tires, some difference of opin-
ion exists. For example, if the insured had all the tools in the
trunk of his car necessary to take the motor apart and put it back
together, would all the tools be considered equipment of the auto-
mobile? If we adhere to the requirement that the term "equip-
ment" includes only those articles that are necessary to the action
or service of the automobile, then only a part of the tools would be
included, perhaps only those customarily kept by an automobile
operator in his car. This would appear to be a reasonable ap-
proach. And with respect to spare tires, how many would one
include as equipment of the automobile? In some areas of the
country one could expect to have one normal spare tire and per-
haps two snow tires. In this circumstance, three spare tires would
be necessary for proper operation of the automobile. However,
one may argue that four or five would also be desirable. Some
insurance adjusters would pay for only three, while others would
pay for more. There is no clearcut criterion.
In determining the equipment of an automobile, there is an
important insurance coverage situation with respect to insurance
contracts other than automobile insurance. If the equipment in-
volved is not to be considered equipment of the automobile, then
it must be considered personal property that may be insured un-
der a "contents" coverage in another type of insurance policy such
52 See Trantham v. Canal Ins. Co., 220 F.2d 752 (6th Cir. 1955); David B.
Kaplus, Inc. v. Home Ins. Co., 26 N.J. Super. 163, 97 A.2d 509 (Super.
Ct. 1953); Steiker v. Philadelphia Nat. Ins. Co., 11 N.J. Super. 55, 77
A.2d 513 (Super. Ct. 1950).
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as a homeowner's contract. For example, if the insured has seven
spare tires that are stolen and the automobile insurance adjuster
considers only three to be equipment of the automobile, then the
other four will be paid for under the insured's homeowner's policy.
This latter policy has a specific exclusion of automobiles. On the
other hand, should the adjuster consider the four tires not part of
the automobile, their loss would not be excluded in the homeown-
er's policy. Or if the adjuster does not consider the cartridges
used in the stereo player attached to the automobile as equipment
of the automobile, their loss could be covered under a homeowner's
policy. It is also possible that a camper unit which is removed
from a truck might be considered no longer part of its equipment,
and after removal it would be considered personal property cov-
ered under the homeowner's policy.
Some adjusters attempt to determine a criterion in terms of
the use of the article. If it can be used both on the automobile
and in the home, it is not considered to be equipment of the auto-
mobile. A whisk broom, or records that can be played both on
the automobile's record player and on the home record player
would not be considered equipment of the automobile. On the
other hand, an automobile camper unit, the cartridges for the
stereo, a rear-view mirror, and a bumper jack would have little if
any reasonable utility in or about one's home. This criterion may
be the result of pure expediency. However, it does provide a rea-
sonable approach to the problem of determining the policy which
will provide coverage.
Most insurance adjusters today will consider equipment per-
manently attached to the automobile to be equipment, and cover-
age will be provided for damage to or destruction under the auto-
mobile policy. Examples would include the car radio, the stereo
player, air-conditioning equipment, camper units, well-drilling
equipment, and the like. Normally the existence of the well-
drilling equipment mounted on a truck or a camper unit so mounted
would not pose any substantial problem for the insurance com-
pany because here the physical damage insurance on the truck
will be written on a stated-value basis. This means that the value
of the equipment must be included along with the value of the
truck if the insured desires complete physical damage coverage.
And if the value of the equipment is included in the stated amount
of insurance, then generally the equipment is insured whether it is
on or off the truck. In the case of other equipment permanently
attached to the automobile, such as the car radio, it appears that it
would still be insured under the automobile insurance if the radio
were temporarily removed for the purpose of repair.
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There is perhaps some speculation and wishful thinking in
the conclusions that we have drawn concerning the equipment of
an automobile. However, until some more law can be developed, or
until the formulators of the insurance contracts provide more pre-
cise definitions, the only approach is to attempt to establish reason-
able criteria. More adequate definitions in the contracts would
perhaps be best, because it is unlikely that litigation will arise in
this area due to the fact that the relatively small values generally
involved do not justify litigation.
